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Summary
Objectives We examined whether misleading information (i.e.
misinformation) may promote symptom reporting in non-clinical
participants.
Design A test–retest study in which we collected baseline data about
participants’ psychological symptoms and then misinformed them that
they had rated two target symptoms relatively highly. During an interview,
we determined whether participants would notice this misinformation
and at direct and one-week follow-up, we evaluated whether the
misinformation would exacerbate retest measures of the same symptoms.
Setting A psychological laboratory.
Participants A total of 78 undergraduate students.
Main outcome measures Participants’ scores on a widely used
self-report measure of psychological symptoms.
Results We found that most participants (63%) were blind to the
discrepancies between their original symptom ratings and the upgraded
scores they were misinformed with. Furthermore, at the one-week follow-
up retest, blind participants revised their symptom ratings in the direction
of the misinformation (i.e. they increased their ratings of these
symptoms).
Conclusion Introspective monitoring of common psychological
symptoms is poor and this creates an opportunity for misinformation and
symptom escalation. Our ﬁnding bears relevance to theories about the
iatrogenic ampliﬁcation of medically unexplained symptoms.
Introduction
It has long been recognized that symptom label-
ling and the medical (e.g. history-taking) and
social (e.g. attending patient support groups)
actions that accompany such labelling may have
iatrogenic effects.
1,2 The mechanisms underlying
such effects are poorly understood. Misleading
information (i.e. misinformation) with which
medical experts accidentally provide their patients
might be a candidate mechanism. An extensive
body of research shows that misinformation may
profoundly bias human memory.
3 However,
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1reporting is scarce. So far, no study tested whether
misinformation about psychological symptoms
leads non-clinical participants to adopt these
symptoms in the long run. It would a priori seem
unlikely that participants would do so, as long
as they recognize that the misinformation is at
odds with their perception of symptom intensity.
Howaccurate are people in monitoring the inten-
sity of their psychological symptoms? Research on
what has been dubbed ‘choice blindness’ demon-
stratesthat people may not be very good in monitor-
ing their choices, intentions and preferences. In
typical studies illustratingthis phenomenon, partici-
pants were shown pairs of photographs of faces.
They were instructed to select the face they found
most attractive. Next, they were given the selected
face and asked to describe the reasons for their
choice. On some trials, however, participants were
given the wrong photograph (i.e. they were misin-
formed about their choice). Most participants did
not notice the discrepancies and these ‘blind’ par-
ticipants even tended to confabulate reasons for
choices they had not made.
4,5 Other studies found
that when people are misled into believing that
they selected a certain option (e.g. a vacation desti-
nation or a symptom), their endorsement of that
option becomes stronger.
6,7
We examined what happens when participants
are misinformed about their symptom scores.
More speciﬁcally, we explored whether something
akin to choice blindness (‘symptom blindness’)
would occur under such circumstances and if so,
whether being blind to symptom misinformation
would exacerbate one-week follow-up ratings of
these symptoms. Our study bears relevance to
situations in which healthy individuals with
benign symptoms seek medical help and are pro-
vided with labels that have strong medical conno-
tations (e.g. ﬁbromyalgia).
Methods
Undergraduate students (n=78; mean age =20.7
yrs; 60 women) volunteered to participate in the
study in return for a small ﬁnancial compensation.
Participantswere tested individually.Figure 1pro-
vides an overview of the different stages in the
experiment. At baseline (T1), all participants ﬁrst
completed the Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90;
Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973).
8 This widely
used 90-item scale addresses a broad range of
psychological symptoms (e.g. depression,
anxiety, fatigue). Participants indicate on a
5-point scale (anchors: 0= not at all; 4 =all the
time) to what extent they experienced each
symptom in the past week. We were not interested
in total SCL-90 scores, but rather focused on two
selected target items embedded in a series of
eight control items (see below).
After they had completed the SCL-90, partici-
pants received a ﬁller task consisting of two
Sudoku puzzles. Each puzzle took 5–7 min.
While the participant was busy solving the
Sudoko puzzles, two target items of the already
completed SCL-90 were manipulated. More
speciﬁcally, we increased participants’ scores for
these target items by two full scale points. For
example, when the participant rated the target
item about concentration difﬁculties as 0 (i.e. not
at all), this score was erased and replaced by a 2
(i.e. occasionally). In those rare instances in
which participants had scored the target items
with a 3 (a lot) or 4 (all the time), the manipulation
consisted of decreasing the items by two full scale
points (i.e. they were recoded as 1 or 2, respect-
ively). During subsequent statistical analyses,
these scores were reversed coded. In total, 78 ×
2= 156 target items were manipulated. Of these,
only four (3%) concerned downgrading.
Target items pertained to repeated unpleasant
thoughts, trouble remembering things, blaming
yourself for things, worrying too much about
things, trouble concentrating, and uneasy when
others watch you (SCL-90 items 3, 9, 26, 31, 55,
and 61, respectively). These items load on the
general emotional distress factor of the SCL-90.
9
We employed three sets of two target items coun-
terbalanced across the sample. Set 1 consisted of
SCL-90 items 3 and 9, set 2 of items 26 and 31,
and set 3 of items 55 and 61. The experimenter
showed participants their SCL-90 answer sheets
and interviewed them about why they had rated
two targets and eight control items the way they
did. Thus, for target items, the interview conveyed
misinformation. For example, in the case of the
target item about concentration difﬁculties, the
experimenter might ask: ‘Could you please tell
me why you said that you occasionally have trou-
bles concentrating?’ when in fact the participant
had responded with not at all to this symptom.
Target items were positioned half way in the
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Rahul Bhattacharyaseries, with one control item in between the target
items. The interview took about 5 min.
At the end of the session (T2), all participants
ﬁlled out a social desirability scale, the 33-item
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
(MCSDS).
10 Furthermore, to explore the immedi-
ate effects of misinformation, 39 randomly
selected participants were given a short 30-item
version of the SCL-90. Afteroneweek (T3), all par-
ticipants were contacted by email and asked to
complete an electronic version of the 30-item
version and to return it by email. Items of the
short version were also rated on a 5-point scale.
The short version contained the two target and
eight control items Participants were fully
debriefed after they had returned the electronic
version. The study was approved by the standing
ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology
and Neuroscience, Maastricht University
(ECP-9008-03-2010, April 2010).
Results
Proportion of ‘blind’ participants
During the interview, 58 (74%) participants
accepted the misinformation about the ﬁrst
target item, i.e. explained why they had scored
the item with X when in fact they had scored it
with X±2. Participants were assigned to the
‘blind’ group if and only if they had failed to
notice the discrepancies for both targets items. In
total, 49 participants (63%) were blind to both
target manipulations. Percentages of blind partici-
pants for the three sets of target items ranged from
56–72%, but did not differ signiﬁcantly as a func-
tion of the sets, χ
2 (2) = 1.53, P= 0.47.
Social desirability (i.e. MCSDS) scores for blind
and non-blind participants were 16.71 (SD =4.90)
and 15.97 (SD = 6.05), respectively, t(76) < 1.0, n.s.
Thus, blind participants did not have higher social
desirability scores than non-blind participants.
Follow-up measures
Figure 2 depicts mean scores of blind and non-
blind participants during baseline (T1), and at
immediate (T2) and one-week follow-up retests
(T3). At baseline, blind participants did not score
higher on target than on control symptoms, t(48)
<1, n.s. Yet, at the immediate retest (T2) and at
the one-week follow-up retest (T3), blind partici-
pants scored higher on target symptoms than on
control symptoms, t(24) =3.95, P <0.01 and
t(48) =3.41, P <0.01, respectively. For the non-
blind group, all comparisons between target and
control symptoms at T1, T2, and T3 fell short of
signiﬁcance, all ts <1.21, all Ps> 0.11.
We also performed a 2 (group: blind vs.
non-blind) × 2 (symptoms: target vs. control)
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOV A)
on baseline (T1) data. This revealed that before
the misinformation manipulation, blind partici-
pants already had higher symptom scores than
non-blind participants, F(1, 76) = 8.16, P <0.01,
ŋ
2
p =0.10, although there were no main or inter-
action effects of symptom (both Fs (1, 76) <1, n.s.).
A 2 (group) × 2 (time: T1 vs. T2)× 2 (symptoms)
ANOV A performed on the data gathered in the
immediate retest subgroup (n=39) again revealed
that overall, blind participants (n= 25) had higher
symptom scores than non-blind participants, F
(1, 37) = 4.13, P< 0.01, ŋ
2
p= 0.10. Also, both
target and control symptoms received higher
scores over time, F(1, 37) =12.73, P <0.01, ŋ
2
p=
0.26. At the immediate retest (T2), target scores
were higher than control scores, but only so for
the blind group, as evidenced by a group ×




A 2 (group) × 2 (time: T1 vs. T3)× 2 (symptom)
ANOV A on baseline and one-week follow-up data
indicated that blind participants had higher symp-
toms scores than non-blind participants, F(1, 76) =
16.38, P <0.01, ŋ
2
p =0.18. Furthermore, targets
Figure 1
Timeline of the experiment. T1 =baseline; T2 = after misinforma-
tion about target items; T3= one-week follow-up; SCL-90 =
Symptom Checklist-90 (at T2 and T3 short versions); MCSDS=
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
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3received higher scores than control symptoms at
follow-up, F(1, 76) = 4.37, P <0.05, ŋ
2
p =0.05, but
this was qualiﬁed by the critical group × time×
symptoms interaction that approached signiﬁ-




Statement of principal ﬁndings
The main ﬁndings of our study can be catalogued
as follows. First, when confronted with mislead-
ing information about certain symptoms, many
participants will fail to detect the misinformation.
Second, participants who are blind to symptom
misinformation tend to adopt this misinformation,
as manifested in their raised symptom intensity
ratings at follow-up tests. Third, blind participants
do not differ from non-blind participants in social
desirability, making it unlikely that the crucial
difference between both groups is sensitivity to
social demands. Rather blindness for symptom
misinformation seems to reﬂect poor monitoring
of symptom intensity, just as choice blindness
reﬂects poor introspective insight into choices,
intentions and preferences.
4–7
This interpretation is supported by the ﬁnding
that already at baseline (T1), blind participants
had higher symptom ratings than non-blind par-
ticipants. Apparently, a non-zero symptom inten-
sity level introduces ambiguity; thereby raising
the probability that misinformation is accepted.
This pattern is compatible with literature indicat-
ing that neurotic people are more suggestible
than non-neurotic people.
11 It is also compatible
with research that found certain personality
Figure 2
Mean scores of blind (n=49) and non-blind (n=29) participants on target and control symptoms (range
0–4) during baseline (T1), and at immediate (T2) and one-week follow-up retests (T3). Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean
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4traits to be involved in somatization, i.e. the ten-
dency to experience benign and trivial sensations
as noxious and pathological.
12
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
A limitation of our study is that it relied on under-
graduate students and their intensity ratings of
psychological symptoms. We do not know to
what extent our results can be generalized to
patient groups and to intensity ratings of bodily
symptoms. Clearly, the boundary conditions of
blindness for symptom misinformation deserve
systematic study.
Our study is also silent as to the issue of
whether misinformation can be used to reduce
symptom intensity ratings. Germane to this issue
are studies showing that misinformation about a
negative experience with fattening food may
lead people not only to believe that they had
gotten sick after eating this food, but also to
avoid this food.
13 It would be interesting to
explore whether such positive effects can be paral-
leled in studies on misinformation and symptom
intensity.
Strengths and weaknesses in relation
to other studies
Previous studies determined that in certain
patient groups, false feedback information about
physiological parameters lead to immediate
symptom escalation. For example, false feedback
of asthmatic wheezing sounds elicits breathless-
ness in asthmatic children.
14 Likewise, false heart
rate feedback increases anxiety in panic patients.
15
One recent experiment in our lab found that when
healthy people are misinformed about their
psychological symptoms, this will immediately
increase their ratings of these symptoms, but
only so if they fail to detect the misinformation.
7
The current study extends previous research in
that it provides the existence proof for long-term
effects of misinformation on symptom reporting.
Our ﬁnding is reminiscent of the extensive
research on how misinformation may create
robust pseudo-memories. Thus, confronting indi-
viduals repeatedly with false information about
a ﬁctitious event (e.g. as a child having had a
skin sample removed as part of a medical
procedure), leads many of them to develop
detailed recollections of this event.
3,16,17 Such
recollections are often maintained even when par-
ticipants are confronted with contradictory evi-
dence. We suggest that symptom intensity
escalation due to misinformation behaves like
pseudo-memories. For example, a recent case
study illustrated how diagnostic misinformation
convinced a 58-year-old woman that she suffered
from Alzheimer’s disease and how she clung to
this diagnosis even when it was proven to be
wrong.
18 Our ﬁndings were collected in a sample
of healthy undergraduates and therefore, they
need to be supplemented by clinical case studies
on, for instance, diagnostic errors and their long-
term effects on symptom reporting.
Meaning of the study: possible
mechanisms and implications for
clinicians
Medically unexplained or – as some authors prefer
to call them – functional symptoms are not uncom-
moninpatientsattendinggeneralmedicalfacilities,
with prevalence estimates being as high as 12%.
Thesesymptomsofteninvolvevaguepsychological
symptoms (e.g. feelings of fatigue, depression,
anxiety, tension) and the diagnostic label that is
given to this constellation may depend on the
medical experts that patients consult. Some
authors have noted that there is a substantial
overlap between labels such as chronic fatigue,
ﬁbromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome and
chronic pain.
1,2,19 There are good reasons to
assume that iatrogenic factors may exacerbate
symptom intensity in these patient groups. More
speciﬁcally, expressing concern about the possi-
bility of an underlying disease and, related to this,
excessive investigation and attending patient
support groups may all contribute to symptom
escalation. What these interventions have in
common is that they convey the message to the
patient that his or her symptoms might be more
intense and severe than he/she thinks they are.
Our study suggests that blindness to unintended
misinformation about the severity of the symptoms
may underlie escalation of symptoms. Some
expertshavepointedoutthatappropriateinterview
techniques might reduce the risk of iatrogenic
damage in these patients groups.
1 We agree and
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5would add that an appropriate interview style is
one that refrains from exploring the whole spec-
trum of possible symptoms.
Unanswered questions and future
research
Our study demonstrates that symptom reporting is
susceptible to misinformation when this misinfor-
mation is not recognized as such. However, our
study is silent as to whether this effect reﬂects
altered symptom perception or reporting bias.
Blind and non-blind participants did not differ in
their social desirability scores, indicating that an
account in social psychological terms (e.g. confor-
mity) is not very likely. The same is true for our
ﬁnding that at one-week follow-up, blind partici-
pants tended to give higher intensity ratings for
target than for control symptoms, even though
these follow-up data were obtained by email and
so the demands that might be created by
face-to-face contact with the researchers were
absent. Again, this argues against a purely social
psychologicalexplanation.Takentogether,our ﬁnd-
ings are best explained by assuming that misinfor-
mation biased blind participants’ perception of
ambiguous symptoms. Nevertheless, the issue of
whether misinformation effects on symptom inten-
sity scores reﬂect reporting or perception warrants
further study. But even if symptom blindness
would only reﬂect a reporting bias phenomenon,
it would be relevant to clinical practice and
research, because therapy outcome, particularly in
the domain of psychiatry and clinical psychology,
is often based on self-reports of symptoms.
20
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